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ABSTRACT: The digital relies on computation. Programming 
uses algorithms. Algorithms are sets of rules that solve 
problems in a finite number of steps. In this sense, the digital 
world is governed by quantities, numbers, fixed rules. The 
degree of freedom seems to be very limited. Artistic agency and 
creativity, on the other hand, rely on openness, freedom, and 
qualitative experiences. Such experiences are not only vital to 
artistic expression but also to everyday life. Technological life-
worlds as they are represented through current technologies 
(e.g. smart homes or automated driving) and science fiction 
do not seem to accommodate such open structures. The 
philosophy of technology is divided: Many hold that to a 
large extent technology determines human cognition (such 
as Mark B.N. Hansen, Bernard Stiegler) and thus subordinate 
human cognition to mechanical organizations. Others take a 
different approach and reflect on the creative potential of new 
technologies (e.g. Erin Manning, Jaime del Val). 
This article discusses theories that address the human-
machine relationship as complex structures that go beyond 
the dystopian idea of humans being transcended or 
incorporated by technology. Such approaches are central to 
the discussion on the future of human beings and cultural-
political shaping of life-worlds. To understand how human-
machine relationships can be framed as open and creative 
processes, I present epistemological accounts of embodied 
cognition, artistic examples of performance strategies with 
algorithmic set-ups, and finally embed these aspects within 
a broader picture of conceptualizing technology and human 
life as a continuum rather than standing in opposition or 
being determined by the other. 
KEYWORDS: Technology, Artificial Intelligence, experience, 
phenomenology, art.
RESUMEN: Lo digital descansa en la computación. La programa-
ción utiliza algoritmos. Los algoritmos son el conjunto de reglas 
que resuelven problemas en un número finito de pasos. En este 
sentido, el mundo digital está regido por cantidades, números, 
reglas fijas. El grado de libertad parece muy limitado. Por el con-
trario, la actividad artística y la creatividad descansan en la aper-
tura, la libertad y en experiencias cualitativas. Estas experiencias 
no solo son vitales para la expresión artística, sino para la vida co-
tidiana. Los mundos-vitales tecnológicos tal como se representan 
en tecnologías actuales (por ejemplo, en las casas inteligentes o 
en la conducción automática) o en la ciencia ficción no parecen 
dar cabida a estas estructuras abiertas. La filosofía de la tecnolo-
gía está dividida: muchos sostienen que la tecnología determina 
en gran medida la cognición humana (como Mark B. N. Hansen, 
Bernard Stiegle) y, consiguientemente, subordina la cognición 
humana a las organizaciones maquinales. Otros adoptan una 
aproximación diferente y reflexionan sobre el potencial creativo 
de las nuevas tecnologías (Erin Mannig, Jaime del Val).
Este artículo discute teorías que abordan la relación huma-
no-máquina en tanto que estructuras complejas que van más 
allá de la visión distópica del ser humano siendo trascendido o 
incorporado por la tecnología. Estas aproximaciones son cen-
trales para discutir el futuro del ser humano y la conformación 
político-cultural de los mundos vitales. Para entender cómo las 
relaciones humano-máquina pueden considerarse como proce-
sos abiertos y creativos, presento narrativas de cognición cor-
poralizada, ejemplos artísticos de estrategias de performance 
con sistemas algorítmicos, y finalmente engarzo estos aspectos 
en un panorama más amplio sobre la conceptualización de la 
tecnología y la vida humana como un continuo, en vez de una 
sostenida oposición o un estar determinado por el otro.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Tecnología, inteligencia artificial, experien-
cia, fenomenología, arte.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The digital relies on computation. Programming is 
done through algorithms and algorithms are sets of 
rules that solve problems in a finite number of steps. 
In that light, the digital world is governed by quanti-
ties, numbers, fixed rules. That reminds of the image 
I used in the title –painting by numbers. Painting by 
numbers is a thing we know from children’s books as 
a way to keep them busy, maybe teach them some-
thing about how to draw with colors. It does however 
also exist for adults as a means to engage with art, to 
imitate artworks. Such practices of guided creativity 
or life hacks are very popular in times where there is 
an app for literally anything. There is a tendency in 
contemporary life to trust the senses and embodied 
cognition less than digital measurements: Cars park 
themselves, calendars send out alarms for each acti-
vity, electric cookers cook meals by themselves and 
fridges order food. One could go on and find innume-
rable examples where human skill has been replaced 
through technology. The overall presence of quanti-
tative thinking is problematic for human creativity in 
a larger sense, namely the active engagement with 
technologies and a productive form of critique. My 
aim is a phenomenological reflection of technological 
affordances in applications today and the possibilities 
of creating more holistic technologies through en-
gaging with artistic practices. The idea is to envision 
applications that are designed as environments which 
solicit much more holistic forms of agency than our 
contemporary screen culture does. My concept of 
art as a means of reflection on technology draws on 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological account 
of art as making invisible foundations of experience 
visible or perceptable. Even if his theory mainly con-
siders painting, I argue that especially new media art 
and performance art have the potential to reflect on 
human-machine relations in productive ways.
Three essential forms of human engagement in 
technological life-worlds seem to fall short of affordances, 
of interesting solicitations for agency and engagement 
here: 
1. Qualitative first-person experiences: Even though 
first-person experience is a necessary aspect of 
human consciousness and cannot be canceled 
out by machine culture. Today most technologies 
are designed to make life easier and function in 
a preemptive way. That leads to a reduced trust 
in one’s own intuition or gut feeling, if you will. 
Also, perception of bodily and emotional states is 
often delegated to sensing devices such as smart 
watches or other wearables. Thus, qualitative 
first-person experience can be viewed as being 
functionally replaced machine agency when it 
comes to decision making and many other kinds 
of skill based human agency. This also holds for 
example in the case of artificial intelligence used 
in recruiting or decision making processes in 
credit institutes. 
2. The sense of agency: This is the experience 
to exert causal force or to change something, 
which is vital for humans to establish a per-
sonality. With the ubiquity of standardization 
and normization as well as automation and the 
growing field of machine agency, the experien-
ce of being an agent in human risks to being re-
duced to less meaningful fields. This is follows 
from the reduced trust in one’s won perception 
and hence first person experience.
3. Creativity: Creativity becomes problematic in 
the context of digital technology because of 
the tendency to replace the active use skills 
by more or less passive reactions. I am not 
making any claims here for the nature of artistic 
production. My interest lies in the everyday 
use of creative digital tools like Instagram, 
Photoshop or social media platforms. I do not 
view them as endangering creativity, rather 
my aim is to look at them from a performative 
view point (Coeckelbergh, 2020). From such a 
perspective, everyday creative engagements 
tend to become more and more limited to 
choosing between option (like filters for 
images) instead of production or active creation 
of things. We can draw an analogy to this view 
by looking at passive and active command of 
languages. Passive knowledge of a language 
allows understanding, but no expression of 
thoughts. The expressive side of creativity 
in the light of today’s application is not very 
restricted. Those three aspects as vital sources 
of human self-understanding require openness 
of structures and processes instead of precise 
prediction and optimization. This tension is 
characteristic of contemporary life-worlds. I 
will elaborate on this in section three.
The degree of freedom in standard human-techno-
logy relations is limited. But artistic creativity relies on 
openness, freedom and qualitative experiences. Such 
experiences are not only vital to artistic expression 
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but also to everyday life. Technological life-worlds as 
they are represented through current technologies 
(e.g. smart homes or automated driving) and science 
fiction do not seem to accommodate such open struc-
tures (e.g. Förster, 2020a). The theoretical accounts 
in philosophy of technology are divided: Many hold 
that technology determines human cognition (e.g. 
Stiegler, 1998; Hansen, 2012). Others take a different 
approach and reflect on the creative potential of new 
technologies (e.g. Manning, 2016; Jaime del Val in his 
projects, see www.reverso.org) or concentrate on the 
material artifacts from a postphenomenological pers-
pective (Ihde, 2001; Verbeek, 2005). 
My aim is to reflect on human-machine relations 
as complex structures beyond the dystopian idea 
of humans being transcended or determined by 
technology. Such an approach is central to the 
discussion of human futures and cultural-political 
shaping of life-worlds. In my attempt to understand 
how human-machine relations can be framed as open 
and creative processes I will analyze epistemological 
accounts of embodied cognition, artistic examples 
of performance strategies and finally embed these 
aspects within a broader picture of conceptualizing 
technology and human life as a continuity rather than 
standing in opposition or being determined by the 
other. Human-machine relations have to be viewed 
as complex forms of becoming with each other, 
whereas the lines between human and machinic 
agency or creativity become blurred. This is where 
the analysis gets interesting. When I put the concept 
of experience forward, I am not arguing in favor of an 
anthropocentric view. Quite the opposite: Experience 
in technological life-worlds shapes both sides and 
creates new forms of hybrid creativity1.
2. THEORETICAL FRONTLINES: CONCEPTUALIZING 
THE HUMAN BEYOND THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL 
TRAP 
When thinking about technology today one is 
trapped between two rather undesirable narratives: 
One involves the infamous singularity (Kurzweil, 
2006): a looming technological superintelligence 
that either transcends human life or destroys it. 
The other narrative is a late product of the tale of 
progress that fueled modern age: The idea that 
technology enhances human living conditions and as 
1  The question of the status of art created by artificial intelligences is not my focus here.
2  For an account of cinematic narratives of posthuman futures and their dystopic logic see Förster, 2016.
a contemporary twist, ultimately frees us from our 
mortal bodies. This narrative involves strong ideas 
of control, a normative account of what it means to 
live a good live and thus might be exclusive toward 
differences and multiplicity of (unenhanced) life 
forms. The negative tendencies in the narratives 
of technological progress can already be seen in 
biased algorithms, for example in the credit systems 
of banks or in facial recognition software and other 
applications that implicitly reproduce gender and 
racial biases (e.g. Coeckelbergh, 2019).
The tale of the singularity on the one hand could be 
coined as a proponent of technological posthumanism 
according to Janina Loh (2018: 92-129). This view 
of technological development does not regard 
the human as central concept but emphasizes a 
technological evolution beyond the human life-
form. Humans are conceived of as enablers of a 
development that sooner or later emerges from the 
technological habitat itself and thus does not need 
human agency anymore. The autonomy of technology 
culminates theoretically in a determinism because 
technology then dominates human life and not vice 
versa. The tale of transhumanism on the other hand 
sees the human as active user of technology and 
creator of enhanced human life forms. This narrative 
draws on traditional humanist views of human life. 
Here it is the human that determines its own techno-
evolutionary fate, although this can also be seen as 
a technological determinism since the driving factor 
in this narrative is technology. Both narratives evoke 
utopian and dystopian images of the future, which 
can be viewed as symptoms of the current uneasiness 
with technological futures. This becomes visible in 
many Sci-Fi narratives2. 
In the current pandemic situation we see an even 
more accelerated development of communication and 
surveillance technologies as well as artificial intelligence 
in general. The question that is being asked in this 
volume is about the critical potential of technology. Can 
the standard use and design of technological artifacts 
and environments be critiqued by its very own means? 
Can technology be used to unveil its own workings, 
biases and restrictions and thus open new perspectives 
on how to create human-machine coexistence? That 
reminds of Martin Heidegger’s famous dictum of the 
saving power lying in the danger, namely technology 
a602
Painting by num
bers: digital technology and the art of living
4
ARBOR Vol. 197-800, abril-junio 2021, a602 | ISSN-L: 0210-1963 https://doi.org/10.3989/arbor.2021.800004
itself: «Thus the coming to presence of technology 
harbors in itself what we least suspect, the possible 
arising of the saving power» (Heidegger, 1977: 32). He 
held the view that the essence of technology is neither 
an instrument nor a human activity, but beyond all 
that a way of seeing the world. Modern technology 
according to Heidegger has become the only way in 
which we conceive of the environment and ourselves: 
as a standing reserve (Heidegger, 1977: 24). One can 
criticize his view as romantic with regard to premodern 
technology and too pessimistic concerning modern 
technology. But Heidegger certainly has a point that 
is more relevant today than ever: Contemporary 
technologies use humans as a standing reserve, more 
accurately as a reservoir for data mining that enables 
prediction of behavior and control. The fact that most 
applications today rely on prediction of behavior in 
order to control or solicit human agency has found 
its echo in theoretical reflections on technological 
determinism (e.g. Hayles, 2012). 
Determinism receives a distinctive twist when 
looking at artificial intelligence: predictions through 
algorithmic processing are being made on the basis 
of tracking and sensing technologies. The output of 
such technologies is created on timescales that lie 
beyond the human capacity of perception. When 
a search engine generates a feed, it combines data 
of the user with a prediction of the search behavior 
and the actual content of what is being typed. This 
happens in fractions of seconds and can in the case 
of complex and self-learning algorithms not be 
made explicit by the programmer3. The information 
environment generated by search engines is a result 
of a computation that can digest masses of data 
in order to determine a profile of the user and use 
this targeted advertisement, nudging and so on. 
Large parts of our technological environment, from 
wearables to the internet of things and smart cities 
is based in predictive technologies that operate on 
temporal levels beyond human perception. This 
means that it is not actually us using and controlling 
technology but vice versa: they solicit human behavior 
through predictive strategies (Hansen, 2012).
One way of interpreting this scenario is to 
understand technology as generating new affordances 
(Gibson, 1979/1986: 127-146). Affordances are 
possibilities for human agency. This human activity in 
turn alters the environment, which then might again 
3  This raises questions concerning ethical implications and the call for an explainable AI, whose outputs can be traced entirely (Sudmann, 2020).
include new affordances generated through these 
interactions. If theories of technological determinism 
are interpreted against the backdrop of theories of 
embodied cognition one can give the deterministic 
scenario another twist: If human cognition coevolves 
with the environment or the respective life-world 
then this environment is neither pregiven nor simply 
deterministic. Maurice Merleau-Ponty stresses the 
coevolution and co-emergence of subject and object, 
humans and their environment (Merleau-Ponty, 1963 
and 1966/2014). It is the relation and developmental 
processes that specifies both. This process is conceived 
of as open ended. As long as a subject or an organism 
is engaged within an environment, both are emerging 
together – a thought which is developed in detail in 
enactive theories (e.g. Varela, Thompson and Rosch, 
1993). This view can be adopted for a description of 
human-technology relations. In combining theories of 
embodied cognition and their idea of co-emergence 
with current analyses of digital technologies in 
philosophy and media theory one can develop 
descriptive tools that capture both the characteristics 
of technologies, the development of new affordances 
within a life-world permeated by intelligent and 
sensing technologies as well as the qualitative changes 
that arise for humans as perceiving and experiencing 
subjects. This goes beyond the postphenomenological 
approach, because the focus is not on the materiality 
of technology but the emergence of human-machine-
relations and the potential for a less deterministic 
view of technology.
Analyzing technology as a vital part of contemporary 
environments helps to emphasize both its role in 
the emergence of novel forms of experiences and 
qualitative states as well as describing technologies as 
processes that unfold in process of usage. Within the 
larger scope of a critique of anthropocentrism and the 
dualistic views inherited by humanist theories which 
I share, this might seem a step backwards from the 
current state of the art. Philosophical posthumanism 
as presented by Janina Loh, Rosi Braidotti and many 
others arguments in favor of transcending the human 
by critically engaging in the attempt to redefine human 
life beyond the traditional dichotomies of human/
non-human, subject/object, and nature/culture. As 
a consequence, the emergence of qualitative states 
of experience in technological environments has 
not received a lot of attention. Most of the theories 
prioritize relations instead of relata (e.g. Barad, 
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2007). I will argue here that we cannot abstract 
from experience if we want to recalibrate our view 
on technology (see Förster, 2020b). In the following 
section my aim is to take a closer look at specific 
contemporary technologies and the way they structure 
life-worlds. I will contrast the two perspectives of 
technology as a logic of quantification and experience 
as qualitative state in order to uncover entanglements 
beyond this rather superficial dichotomy.
3. THE LIFEWORLD: QUANTIFICATION VS. EMBO-
DIED QUALITATIVE EXPERIENCE 
The attempt to understand the grammar of new 
technologies, to speak with Marshall McLuhan 
(1964/1994), is a complex task because it involves 
an understanding of dynamic and emergent proces-
ses. Edmund Husserl’s concept of the life-world will 
be taken here as a starting point to set the stage for 
some examples4. Husserl develops this notion in his 
book on The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcen-
dental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenome-
nological Philosophy (1936). It has a twofold meaning: 
Firstly, it describes the ground of all shared human 
experience, it is the broad horizon in which things and 
humans exist and interact. Secondly, it describes the 
life-world in an epistemological perspective as being 
the ground from which all knowledge (including scien-
tific knowledge) gains perspective and meaning. It is 
the life-world that makes abstract knowledge mea-
ningful. The forgetfulness of the life-world in modern 
science is the crisis Husserl describes. When knowle-
dge production in science has no relation to lived ex-
perience it will become meaningless in the long run.
Contemporary life-worlds are environments filled 
with artifacts that have been produced by the scien-
tific worldview and which are connected, responsive 
and possess agency. Computer technology subscribes 
to classic scientific values such as objectivity, quanti-
fication, prediction and optimization. These are the 
characteristics that Heidegger detected at the birth 
hour of modern technology, namely in the rise of mo-
dern physics. According to Heidegger modern physics 
has not been the enabler of the development of tech-
nology, but is itself already a product of the essence 
or spirit of modern technology, the logic of the enfra-
ming that entails measurement, prediction and domi-
4  I will not give a Husserlian interpretation or hermeneutic reconstruction of this concept but rather use it as backdrop for considerations 
that include phenomenological descriptions and theories of embodied cognition.
5  Tim Ingold (2014) holds that creativity depends on relations and processes in which humans and things are entangled and enmeshed in 
processes of becoming.
nation of nature (Heidegger, 1977: 24). If Heidegger is 
onto something here, then today’s problem is not so 
much the technology itself but the perspective it casts 
on humans and the life-world alike. That is not to say 
that technology in itself is or can be neutral. I would 
argue along the lines of McLuhan (1964/1994) that 
every device orchestrates new relations and cons-
tellations in the social, practical and communicative 
sphere and thus cannot be neutral. It affords always 
novel ways of agency and perception. 
The point I want to make here is that neither tech-
nology nor humans can be identified as the driving 
force in the development of this relation. Humans are 
not simply determined by technology nor is techno-
logy a simply a means to an end. In the following I 
will consider a few examples from recent technolo-
gical developments and analyze them as a modula-
tion of life-world entanglements with regard to their 
processuality and potential for creative and engaged 
agency5. I will do so with regard to experience, agency 
and creativity as central features of human rapports 
within the life-world.
1. Qualitative First-Person Experiences
Qualitative first-person experience is what charac-
terizes conscious life. It is still an open question how 
self-consciousness and first-person-experience is gene-
rated in the brain. Qualitative states come in degrees, 
they are not only a property of human life, but of life 
in general, from minimal forms of consciousness to fu-
ll-fledged human self-consciousness. This is the water-
shed that divides artificial intelligences from humans: 
They do not have qualitative mental states, at least not 
in the foreseeable future –a general AI is beyond con-
temporary technological possibilities. The quality of ex-
perience, what it feels like to have a certain experience, 
a body or an aching body for that matter, this is noto-
riously hard to grasp through scientific methods (comp. 
Förster, 2020b). Neuroscience predominantly searches 
for neural correlates of certain cognitive or emotional 
states. This unfortunately does not say anything about 
the subjective quality of experience.
Many contemporary technologies are just about 
that: Creating a user experience or predicting qualita-
tive experiences as solicitors of agency (e.g. in targe-
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ted marketing). How do they do that? They use scien-
tific insight. The fact that we do not know much about 
qualitative states seems to keep no one from making 
educated guesses of how to induce them. This is si-
milar to the effects of antidepressants. It is not clear 
how they causally act on neural dynamics but they 
mostly do so successfully. Social media and commu-
nication technologies such as Facebook, Instagram or 
TikTok are means to engineer qualitative experiences 
in users within the virtual world. Let us take a look at 
Facebook. This platform has come under strong cri-
tique after the US elections in 2016, when the data 
mining company Cambridge Analytica developed Fa-
cebook profiles of some 220 million US citizen and 
influenced their voting behavior through targeted 
information spreading. This is what is known as in-
formation bubbles. The virtual environment is not an 
arbitrary mix of information in form of a feed. Rather 
it is an algorithmically congregated theater played out 
in front of the user’s eyes. It reflects the image of the 
user seen from the perspective of an algorithm that 
gathers data according to a logic of sets of preferen-
ces deduced from earlier behavior. Such a platform 
can be seen as a form of environment in which the 
user finds affordances as possibilities for action and in 
turn through engagement in this environment leaves 
traces that change or specify this environment in rela-
tion to her agency. Experience here is largely impove-
rished: Firstly, the user is engaged in this environment 
as disembodied or minimally embodied. All forms of 
experience find their expressions in limited ways of 
short commentaries, emoticons, GIFs and or measu-
rements of gaze duration. Secondly, other than a na-
tural environment or the material life-world, this vir-
tual world is determined through intentions that are 
hidden from the user. A natural environment is not 
created as a means to an end, but represents a fac-
tual existence that can afford action possibilities only 
in relation to an organism. The virtual environment 
always has a hidden agenda that creates monetary 
profitability. Facebook is in fact a marketplace that 
mines data of potential buyers and turns them into 
advertisement profits. That means human experience 
in such a virtual reality is implicitly guided and instru-
mentalized. Agency within these kinds of social media 
is strongly mediated through algorithmic structuring 
of information and less so through active engagement 
and qualitative experiences.
On the positive side there is a layer in which human 
experience can also profit from quantification through 
computer technology: Lev Manovich argues in his 
article Computer vision, human senses, and language 
of art (2020) that natural languages fail to account 
for the details and fine-grained differentiations in 
human experience. Using digital analysis for the 
representation of analogue artefacts is according to 
Manovich closer to the actual experience than natural 
language could ever come:
«Numerical measurements of cultural artifacts, 
interactions and behaviors give us a new language 
to talk about cultural artifacts and experiences. This 
language is closer to how the senses represent ana-
log information (sounds, music, colors, spatial forms, 
movement, etc.) The senses translate their inputs into 
quantitative scales, and this is what allows us to diffe-
rentiate between many more sounds, colors, move-
ments, shapes, textures than natural languages. So, 
when we represent analog characteristics of artifacts, 
interactions and behaviors as data using numbers, we 
get the same advantages. This is why a language of 
numbers is a better fit than human languages for des-
cribing analog aspects of culture» (Manovich, 2020).
Manovich holds that digital technologies, namely 
the mathematical description of physical artefacts is a 
new language to describe experiences. His argument 
is that there is an analogy between a computer mo-
dels the mathematical properties of artefacts and the 
way the neural processes translate sensory input into 
qualitative experiences. This is an interesting way to 
shed light on the material culture. But it runs into si-
milar problems as neuroscience does, when it comes 
to accounting for first person experience. As Mano-
vich points out, the «senses translate their inputs into 
quantitative scales». That holds true for the descrip-
tion of the neural process with its distributed informa-
tion processing and diverse levels of synchronicity and 
integration on different time scales. But then again it 
proves difficult to translate such findings back into the 
quest to explain qualitative features of experience. 
2. Agency
Human agency is a central concept to determine 
the possibility to bear responsibility for one’s own 
actions, but also in developing a personal identity. 
Humans need to make the experience of their own 
action as being effective in order to develop a sense 
of the self as independent personality. If one has 
the experience of actions running into the void, of 
not changing anything, then the person is in danger 
of developing self-doubt, depression or pathological 
mental states. The counterpart to human agency today 
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is automation. A simple example is the skill of parking 
a car: Not long ago anyone who learned how to drive 
a car would also need to be able to park it. In order 
to do so successfully one needs to require a feeling of 
the care as an extension of one’s own body. The shape 
and size of the body are a form of implicit or tacit 
knowledge that is not propositional but is actualized 
in sensory motor action. The car as means of transport 
becomes like any other tool partly integrated into the 
body schema of the user6. Once this learning process 
is completed the driver can estimate whether or not 
a given space is large enough for the car to fit in and 
can also perform the movements of the car in a body-
like manner. Even if this is not an impressive example, 
the act of parking is usually accompanied by a sense 
of self-effectiveness. Even more so when it comes to 
craftsmanship, decision making or work in general. 
Today many of these areas can be automated and 
performed by machines. 
There is a tendency to decrease human agency as 
a form of agency prone to error and failure and an 
increase in automated machine agency. More and 
more forms of technological agency are developed 
that do not operate in closed environments such as 
in assembly lines, but more and more technologies 
operate in open, real live situations. Social robots for 
example combine movement in open spaces with 
social communication skills in also potentially open 
communicative situations. By open I mean that the 
space and content of the agency is not completely 
determined through an algorithm or the interactive 
environment. Beyond all criticism there is also potential 
in such open human-machine-relations, such as the 
design of innovative care robots for example.
Johanna Seibt works as a philosopher in the field of 
social robotics and questions the traditional view that 
social robots need to mimic human behavior. Traditio-
nally social robots are designed in an anthropomor-
phic manner with the attempt to duplicate behavior 
and expression of humans. The underlying idea was to 
render them acceptable to human users. Seibt propo-
ses an alternative view that binds successful robotic 
agency not to anthropomorphous properties but to 
sociomorphic ones. That means social robots do not 
mimic human traits and expressionss but the logic of 
social interaction on different scales. She states: 
«[...] social interactions with robots are not always 
the result of anthropomorphizing, i.e., the projection of 
6  For the term body schema see Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 100 [127].
imaginary or fictional human social capacities, but of so-
ciomorphing, i.e., the perception of actual non-human 
social capacities. Sociomorphing can take many forms 
which phenomenally manifest themselves in various 
types of experienced sociality» (Seibt, 2020: 51).
Here again the experiential aspect of human-
machine interactions embedded within a socio-
cultural context seems to be of the essence. Seibt’s 
take on social robotics argues that not all interaction 
with social robots must involve anthropomorphizing, 
which means users only imagine the robots having 
certain quasi-human forms of behavior or mental 
states. She argues that in the design of social robots 
as well as with regard to their use and perception it 
makes sense to draw on a perception-grounded view of 
robot-behavior. She compares the problem of how we 
perceive and interact with social robots to interactions 
with small children or animals, which do have a similar 
range of behavior like social robots. In these cases, 
we perceive «manifestations of capacities» (Seibt, 
2020: 51) rather than imagining them. In children for 
example the capacity for shared attention (such as 
directing their gaze onto an object that’s being pointed 
at by someone else) only develops at a certain age. 
When it is developed, we see that the child intently 
looks at the object of shared attention. Such capacities 
are relevant on very different levels and their being 
manifested is something that can be perceived 
within «experienced sociality». This line of thought 
makes the case for experience being a fundamental 
category also in the design of technological agency. If 
robot behavior is not merely taken as a simulation of 
intelligence or social agency, but becomes part of an 
experienced sociality, then it participates in the human 
life-world as qualitative factor and becomes part of the 
large the socio-material tissue, that includes all kinds 
of agencies, processes and affordances. Framed like 
this, technology can be seen as an important factor 
in experienced sociality and the life-world with its 
affordances for agency in general.
3. Creativity 
The vivid scene of new media, computer and 
performance art using respective technologies shows 
that creativity is in no crisis because of technological 
developments. Quite the contrary: A broad field of 
reflection on the nature of creativity, originality and 
authorship has developed alongside the development 
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of new media. Creativity has also become a huge market 
outside of the art scene in form of creative imaging 
applications: photo and video apps. Some of them are 
not only editing tools but social media platforms, like 
Instagram, Snapchat or TikTok. The editing and filter 
options provided by smart phones apps provide the 
world of artsy image at fingertip’s reach. This is just 
an example for a vast array of applications that solicit 
creativity with easy strategies to succeed. But on a 
basic level this is a reduced creativity like painting by 
numbers. The qualities of a photo get manipulated by 
intensities and quantities: The user can manipulate 
lights, shadows, contrast and colors by sliders, graphs 
or just tapping on filters. On the level of production 
there are finite options to manipulate properties by 
quantifiable enhancements. The result is still a product 
of individual taste, experience and creativity. But the 
creativity is made simple and limited to quantifiable 
adjustments at the same time. Obviously, I am not 
talking of the full potential of programs like Photoshop, 
which by no means are simple or unartistic. But the 
average user will not go into the artistic depths of 
such a program. The development of camera apps for 
example moves away from individual settings to more 
and more predefined modes of photography. This 
camera apps implicitly function as filters and make it 
very easy for users to always have the perfect setting 
right at hand. Creativity here consists in choice, not so 
much in production7. 
If we want creative use of technology to become 
a means of emancipation and critique, we need to 
look beyond the smooth surfaces of social media. 
Are there ways of making visible the functional logic 
of algorithms and create ways of engagement that 
enable users to understand these technologies to a 
fuller extend and participate in the development?
4. TOWARD A NEW ARTISTIC TECHNO-CULTURE
To understand how technology can open up new 
horizons for a more open and inclusive way of living, 
we need to dive deeper into the fabric of human-
machine relations and work creatively with underlying 
technological conditions. What makes the whole 
human-machine world so tricky to understand at least 
from a philosophical perspective or the humanities in 
7  It is also worth researching why most of the creative apps are focused on images or video. Compared to these the presence of apps for 
other forms of creative production is very little. This might be linked to the historical/philosophical prioritization of vision against the other 
senses, that was already present in Greek antiquity. Vision is culturally understood as the noblest of the senses since it does not require 
touch and is analytically closest to conceptual thinking (e.g. the use of central perspective in painting). Also, it is linked to control and 
modern ideas of transparency in society. This is beyond the scope of this article but definitely worth of a follow up research. 
general is the deep entanglement of both. If we take 
a closer look, there is no such thing as the human or 
that technology. The distinction between both is as 
obvious and as unclear as it gets. From an outside 
perspective, we can be very sure if we are talking 
to Alexa, the AI embedded in our living space, or 
our very human neighbor. When we are asking how 
meaningful relations come about within technological 
life-worlds, we need to take a closer look at processes 
of constitution.
At this point of the inquiry a look into the constitution 
of human cognition is necessary. As mentioned at the 
beginning of this article on of the most prominent 
approaches to human-machine relations today is a 
form of techno-determinism. In short this means that 
the evolution of human consciousness beyond its 
natural origins is driven by technological inventions. 
Today technology has come to be the main engineer 
of human perception and cognition because most 
parts of human reality rely on technologies of 
prediction and control that function on timescales 
beyond human sensory capacities. Mark B.N. Hansen 
for example sees this influence as being directed at 
the subpersonal level of human consciousness:
«We must reconceptualise the coupling of human 
and technics beyond the figure of the ‘technical ob-
ject.’ In the wake of computational technologies that 
distribute sensibility beyond consciousness, the corre-
lation between human-implicating individuation and 
technics has moved beyond what we might think of 
as its objective stage [...] and has entered a properly 
processual stage in which technics directly intensifies 
sub-perceptual dimensions of human experience. [...] 
The technical object had to make way for technical 
processes that operate through far more complex im-
brications with human activity» (Hansen, 2012: 51, 55).
The fact that human cognition and technological 
processes are deeply entangled does not necessarily 
lead into a one-sided determinism. Theories of embo-
died cognition, if one can apply such a general label, 
would hold that organisms and their environments 
co-emerge through processes of enaction and skillful 
coping. Eleanor Rosch, Evan Thompson and Francis-
co Varela called this co-constitutive relation «laying 
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down a path in walking» (1993: 237). This image 
stands for the enactive theory of cognition that des-
cribes cognition as a product of a structural coupling 
of organism and environment. Both sides of the re-
lation are constituted through active sensory-motor 
activity couplings that are open ended and proce-
dural. Within the framework of embodied cognition 
cognitive abilities (today this also holds for artificial 
intelligences) develop through active engagement wi-
thin an environment, which itself only gets specified 
through this very action: The path is not only a cogni-
tive path but also a trace organism leave in their envi-
ronment8. The main point here is: Adopting a view of 
cognition as embodied process, the organism and the 
environment become part of a co-constitutional pro-
cess. Technological determinism on the other hand 
stress a more one-sided influence, namely technology 
acting on human perception, not so much the other 
way around. The procedurality of human-technology 
relations is the fundament for forms of creative and 
artistic engagements that arise precisely from the re-
lation and not from only one relatum (human or ma-
chine). Such open structures as conditions for creati-
vity are stressed for examples in Tim Ingold’s research 
(2014). In the remaining pages, I want to argue for a 
view of human-technology relations as being a funda-
ment for critical creative approach to technology by 
means of using technology. Many contemporary ar-
tists create such open spaces of experience with and 
through digital technology. Let me once more reflect 
on Heidegger’s appeal to art as a safeguard against 
the ubiquitous logic of technology: «Could it be that 
the fine arts are called to poetic revealing? Could it be 
that revealing lays claim to the arts most primally, so 
that they for their part may expressly foster the grow-
th of the saving power, may awaken and found anew 
our look into that which grants and our trust in it?» 
(Heidegger, 1977: 35).
He held that technology is a way of revealing. It 
does so but in a limited perspective which turns the 
world into a standing reserve: Technology not only 
brings forth or reveals, it also puts a veil on every 
other possible way of seeing the world. This might 
seem somewhat nostalgic and Heidegger is not very 
8  Environment as defined by Jakob von Uexküll (1909) is not only the surrounding of an organism, but is the world surrounding the orga-
nism in a meaningful way. This is how in one place we can find several forms of being entangled with the surroundings and thus there are 
several environments in the same time and place possible: While my cat inhabits the same apartment space like I do, it is not the same in 
term of affordances. The cat not only perceives different things, e.g. smells different scents, sees different aspects of the interior. There 
are also different types of agency solicited through the same physical space in different organisms. That also means we inhabit the same 
space but not necessarily the same environment, because the environment is the way, surroundings become meaningful or useful for 
certain kinds of perception and agencies.
explicit about what those other ways of seeing might 
reveal or how we could even change our perspective. 
It is by no means a given that technology prevents us 
completely from seeing the world differently. It might 
as well reveal fresh sights and new potentials.
The summoning of the arts in Heidegger comes with 
a catch: Only if art is open to the aim of finding truth, 
the saving power will be actualized. How can art show 
the truth one might ask? Art is about perception, about 
ways to see things in a new light. Seeing differently is 
not yet seeing the truth. He goes one step further and 
speaks of a method: reflection. Art, so Heidegger in the 
last passages of his essay should not be perceived in a 
mere aesthetic way, but solicit reflection:
«But certainly, only if reflection on art, for its part, 
does not shut its eyes to the constellation of truth 
after which we are questioning. Thus questioning, 
we bear witness to the crisis that in our sheer pre-
occupation with technology we do not yet experien-
ce the coming to presence of technology, that in our 
sheer aesthetic mindedness we no longer guard and 
preserve the coming to presence of art. Yet the more 
questioningly we ponder the essence of technology, 
the more mysterious the essence of art becomes. The 
closer we come to the danger, the more brightly do 
the ways into the saving power begin to shine and the 
more questioning we become. For questioning is the 
piety of thought» (Heidegger, 1977: 35).
What Heidegger hopes to be revealed through art 
is the way how the logic of technology, the technolo-
gical worldview comes into existence. He turns to art 
in order to understand how the technological world 
view is constituted. The danger he sees concerning 
art itself, is that it gets subjected to this world view 
as well. The «sheer aesthetic mindedness» can be in-
terpreted as a critique of art as being a mere means 
for distraction and aesthetic pleasure. In that regard 
art becomes instrumental and subjected to the logic 
of technology. If on the other hand art was taken se-
riously and could provoke reflection rather than dis-
traction, Heidegger sees a way to reveal the essence 
of technology through artistic practice and thus a way 
to prevent the danger of technology. Now and then 
a602
Painting by num
bers: digital technology and the art of living
10
ARBOR Vol. 197-800, abril-junio 2021, a602 | ISSN-L: 0210-1963 https://doi.org/10.3989/arbor.2021.800004
the talk of technology as the greatest danger remains 
somewhat obscure. 
It is yet to be elaborated on what art might bring 
to the table concerning a critique of technology. 
Heidegger’s appeal to ultimate dangers and truth is 
more than questionable and unhelpful for coming to 
grips with digital technologies. Rather we will need 
lived experience to actually relate to technological life-
worlds and appropriate them in open creative ways. Art 
or more precisely, art engaged with new technologies 
should open perspectives beyond the standing 
utopian and dystopian narratives about technological 
development that are present in theory, popular 
science and culture. A lived experience of technological 
spaces as fostering agency, qualitative experience 
beyond user-friendliness and frictionless experience 
is what is needed to establish a more emancipated 
use of technology. This surely needs to be turned 
into a broader educational movement of education 
that enables people to understand, undermine and 
subversively appropriate technologies of prediction 
and control.
Today’s life-world is already permeated by sensor 
and control technologies. That means we move and act 
within an increasingly tight knit fabric of technologies 
that sense, predict and interact with humans. Most of 
these technologies are invisible or integrated within 
larger devices such as cars, robots or smart household 
appliances. Technology thus is driven by various form of 
computer vision and artificial sensing in general. There 
is a whole dimension of non-human or better non-
organic sensing present that orchestrates processes 
in everyday life. How can creative engagement tackle 
this dimension? How can these very technologies be 
used to uncover such processes? And can such a non-
aligned use of sensing technologies lead to a new and 
emancipatory appropriation of technology? 
Artistic approaches in New Media or Performance 
Art as today aim at making the fabric of technological li-
fe-worlds visible or they try to rethink/invent new forms 
of interactions or interfaces. This ubiquitous sensitivity 
of the world of perception can be described by the con-
cept of the «flesh», that Merleau-Ponty introduced in 
his late writings (1969). In his theory of perception, he 
argues that perception is grounded in the possibility of 
the perceiver to be perceived as an object too. Percep-
tion hence is dependent on the subject and the object 
being alike, because both are part of the perceptible 
world. Sensing is not merely a subjective capacity but a 
modulation of the fabric or «flesh» of the world. 
Caroline Yan Zheng is a designer who investigates 
modulation of the emotional space through affective 
computing. Her aim is precisely to make these 
modulations palpable and develop interactive designs 
to make people feel such an «open-ended emergence 
and becoming» (Zheng, 2017: 111) of human-
machine relations. To do so, one needs to focus on 
the experiencing subject and its entanglement with 
technology. Coeckelbergh (2020) points out that most 
theories lay emphasis on technological performativity 
and its influence on human behavior without actually 
paying closer attention to those changes from the 
perspective of the subject. The movement of the body, 
the temporal horizon and social interaction make up the 
experience within the technologically permeated fabric 
of the life-world. Coeckelbergh argues for the use of 
metaphors from performance arts in order to capture 
the experiential aspects of human involvements with 
technology. And indeed, technological agency and 
human agency are deeply intertwined. Still when we 
talk about this field of entangled agencies we usually 
think of technology choreographing human behavior. 
Such orchestrated processes draw strongly on habit 
and the absence of friction. In order to understand 
how life is choreographed by technology we need 
to be able to see and perceive both technology and 
embodied perception as well as socio-technological 
interaction. In short, we need to get a grasp of the 
dynamics of ubiquitous sensing, of the flesh of the 
socio-technological life-world, to use Merleau-Ponty’s 
metaphor.  Zheng exemplifies such an attempt with 
her project «Tangible Emotions» (Zheng, 2017: 119), 
in which artefacts equipped with sensors solicit social 
interaction, amplify the participant’s emotions and 
feed these data back into the loop of human-human-
artefact interaction: 
«Feedback in my installations is not unidirectional; 
the kinetic movement of the textiles in turn influences 
the emotions of the participants. And unlike most 
wearable artefacts which utilise individual human-
machine interaction, here when more than one person 
participates, it suddenly becomes a human-human 
interaction, mediated by technological artifacts» 
(Zheng, 2017: 120).
Such artworks create the possibility to make 
feedback loops between embodied perception and 
technological sensing explicit and put the user in the 
position to actively engage in these loops. The goal 
of artistic interventions with regard to technology 
should be to make the inner workings and logic of 
a602
Yvonne Förster
ARBOR Vol. 197-800, abril-junio 2021, a602 | ISSN-L: 0210-1963
11
https://doi.org/10.3989/arbor.2021.800004
technological environments tangible and thus open 
the view for possibilities of interaction, subversion and 
emancipatory forms of usage. That in turn also requires 
knowledge about the human influence on technological 
processes and ideas of how mutual shaping is indeed 
mutual and not a one sided determinism.
5. VISIONS INSTEAD OF CONCLUSIONS
Active engagement is key to an open, emancipated 
and democratic use of technology. Designers and ar-
tists like Zheng can translate these artworks into ac-
tual applications that do not simply follow the ideal of 
frictionless user experience and linear market logics. 
If creators of technology include the user as active 
experiential subject that conceives of technological 
application as an environment in which one finds new 
affordances, challenges and new possibilities, then 
we have come a long way from cybernetic control 
fantasies to people engaging with technology in an 
emancipated way. Such a project needs work, educa-
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